This study examines how codes of conduct, monitoring, and penalties for dishonest reporting affect reporting honesty in an online labor market setting. Prior research supports the efficacy of codes of conduct in promoting ethical behavior in a variety of contexts. However, the effects of such codes and other methods have not been examined in online labor markets, an increasingly utilized resource that differs from previously examined settings in several key regards (e.g., transient workforce, lack of an established culture). Leveraging social (...) norm activation theory, we predict and find experimental evidence that while codes of conduct and monitoring without economic penalties are ineffective in online settings, monitoring with economic penalties activates social norms for honesty and promotes honest reporting in an online setting. Further, we find that imposing penalties most effectively promotes honest reporting in workers who rate high in Machiavellianism, a trait that is highly correlated with dishonest reporting. In fact, while in the absence of penalties we observe significantly more dishonest reporting from workers who rate high versus low in Machiavellianism, this difference is eliminated in the presence of penalties. Implications of these findings for companies, researchers, online labor market administrators, and educators are discussed. (shrink)

By definition, pain is a sensory and emotional experience that is felt in a particular part of the body. The precise relationship between somatic events at the site where pain is experienced, and central processing giving rise to the mental experience of pain remains the subject of debate, but there is little disagreement in scholarly circles that both aspects of pain are critical to its experience. Recent experimental work, however, suggests a public view that is at odds with this conceptualisation. (...) By demonstrating that the public does not necessarily endorse central tenets of the “mental” view of pain (subjectivity, privacy, and incorrigibility), experimental philosophers have argued that the public holds a more “body-centric” view than most clinicians and scholars. Such a discrepancy would have important implications for how the public interacts with pain science and clinical care. In response, we tested the hypothesis that the public is capable of a more “mind-centric” view of pain. Using a series of vignettes, we demonstrate that in situations which highlight mental aspects of pain the public can, and does, recognize pain as a mental phenomenon. We also demonstrate that the public view is subject to context effects, by showing that the public’s view is modified when situations emphasizing mental and somatic aspects of pain are presented together. (shrink)

According to standard philosophical and clinical understandings, pain is an essentially mental phenomenon. In a challenge to this standard conception, a recent burst of empirical work in experimental philosophy, such as that by Justin Sytsma and Kevin Reuter, purports to show that people ordinarily conceive of pain as an essentially bodily phenomenon—specifically, a quality of bodily disturbance. In response to this bodily view, other recent experimental studies have provided evidence that the ordinary concept of pain is more complex than previously (...) assumed: rather than tracking only bodily or only mental aspects of pain, the ordinary concept of pain can actually track either of these aspects. The polyeidic analysis of the folk concept of pain, as proposed by Emma Borg et al., captures this complexity. Whereas previous empirical support for the polyeidic view has focused on the context-sensitivity of the folk concept of pain, here we discuss individual differences in people’s ‘pain priors’—namely, their standing tendencies to think of pain in relatively mind-centric or body-centric ways. We describe a preliminary empirical study and present a small number of findings, which will be explored further in future work. The results we discuss are part of a larger programme of work which seeks to integrate philosophical pain research into clinical practice. For example, we hypothesise that variations in how patients with chronic pain are thinking about pain could help predict their responses to treatment. (shrink)

Boundary extension is a memory phenomenon in which an individual reports seeing more of a scene than they actually did. We provide the first examination of boundary extension in individuals diagnosed with depression, hypothesising that an overemphasis on pre-existing schema may enhance boundary extension effects on emotional photographs. The relationship between boundary extension and overgeneralisation in autobiographical memory was also explored. Individuals with (n = 42) and without (n = 41) Major Depressive Disorder completed a camera paradigm task utilising positive, (...) negative, and neutral stimuli. Across all participants, positive (d = 0.37) and negative (d = 0.66) stimuli were extended more than neutral stimuli. This effect did not differ between depressed and never-depressed participants. Across all participants, images containing objects were extended more than images containing faces. An association was also evident between extension effects in memory for perceptual space and extensions of autobiographical memory across time. (shrink)

The management literature is not short of tools for helping people to make wiser decisions. This paper outlines another tool so it must be asked how can it justify itself given the substantial work that is already done. We suggest that many tools either fail to properly integrate, or simply lack an analysis of (i) showing how emotions help or hinder solving the problem, (ii) the role of creative and critical thinking and (iii), working out what values are at issue (...) in the problem. These three categories can be integrated into a decision-making procedure through an analysis of the stages of decision making. While the emphasis that is laid on these stages will differ depending upon the problem, we suggest that wise decision making requires (i) gaining an adequate understanding of the situation, (ii) working out what matters, (iii) generating options, (iv) selecting an option on the basis of what matters and (v) carrying out the option. As practical philosophers we must ask how each of these stages can be adequately carried out, and here we seek to show how philosophy, and other disciplines, can help for the three areas we identify above as lacunae. In looking at the role of emotions we base our analysis on the Aristotelian and Stoic notion that the core of emotions is that they are judgements. This analysis allows us to make sense of both the rationalist view that emotions are a hindrance, and the romantic notion that emotions are a help. Wise decision making involves unpacking emotions to see what they can reliably tell us about the situation, our values, potential options and how they can motivate us. We suggest ways this task can be achieved. Critical thinking needs to be employed throughout the decision-making procedure so that we fairly and adequately understand the situation and assess potential values and options. We outline some key skills and interventions that can be employed. Critical thinking needs material to work on so we suggest how creative thinking can be used to reframe the situation, and generate potential values and options. The driving force of making a decision is, or at least should be, the values we wish to realise with our decision; what we think matters. Some decisions are purely prudential and here we draw upon ideas of Nozick, Griffin, Aristotle and Epicurus to suggest ways the decision maker can evaluate their prudential values. For ethical decisions ideas from Mill, Kant and others can help us think through what we wish to achieve. We end with a case study to illustrate how the procedure works in practice. (shrink)

I’d like to begin, if I may, by repeating myself. When I spoke at the Institute’s official launch last June, I quoted W.V. Quine’s remark that logic is an old subject, and since 1879 it has been a great one; and I commented that whatever the truth of this, it is undeniably true that philosophy is an old subject and has been a great one since the 5th century BC. The foundation of an institute of philosophy in the University of (...) London has been, in my opinion, a great thing for philosophy and for the University. Our mission is to promote and support philosophy of the highest quality in all its forms, inside and outside the university. With our programmes of events, fellowships and research facilitation, I think we have been carrying out this mission pretty well since our foundation in 2005. But I have already said enough in public about the Institute. Given the occasion, it is appropriate for me to say something instead about philosophy itself. (shrink)

Simmels Buch gehört zu den Werken, die durch die Simmel-Gesamtausgabe, in deren Rahmen die Philosophie des Geldes 1989 erschien, erst wieder nachdrücklich in der Diskussion einer Theorie der Kultur um 1900 und darüber hinaus Berücksichtigung gefunden haben. Vormals v. a. als Soziologe bzw. unter Sozialwissenschaftlern bekannt, hat Simmel seitdem einen Ruf als Philosoph erhalten, der in Wiederaufnahme eines für ihn zeitgenössischen Streites in stellvertretend geführten Debatten erneut gegen das Pejorativum eines bloßen bzw. vulgären, jedenfalls potentiell gefährlichen Relativismus verteidigt wird.

Georg Simmels philosophisches Werk steht quer zu etablierten Fachgrenzen. Das gilt auch für die "Philosophie des Geldes", in dem sein Interesse an unterschiedlichen Phänomenen des Sozial- und Kulturlebens – Freiheit, Weltanschauung, Gesellschaft, Politik, Religion, Kunst u.v.m – sich bereits abzeichnet, bevor es in den folgenden Jahren in Schriften zur Soziologie, Psychologie, Ästhetik, Kulturtheorie entfaltet wird. Schon der Titel einer "Philosophie des Geldes" ist ein Novum. Hier wird nämlich ein Bereich des sozialen Lebens, das wirtschaftliche Leben, zum Gegenstand der Analyse gemacht, (...) um nicht die Einheit des kulturellen Lebens, sondern um dessen geistige Grundlagen zu untersuchen. In der Selbstanzeige des Buches für den Verlag Duncker & Humblot schreibt Simmel, dass er mehrere Zielsetzungen verfolgt. Zum einen will er die Einseitigkeiten von Idealismus und Materialismus korrigieren und Geschichte respektive Kultur als ein Wechselspiel zwischen materiellen und ideellen Faktoren begreifen. Zum anderen will er den Beweis führen, dass sich von jedem Punkte der gleichgültigsten, unidealsten Oberfläche des Lebens ein Senkbeil in seine letzten Tiefen des menschlichen lebens werfen lässt. Damit ist gemeint, dass jedes Lebensphänomen als ein Aspekt und ein Träger einer Einheit von Sinn angesehen werden kann. Die These ist, dass sich menschliches Leben als Sinngeschehen vollzieht, was sich in allen Lebensvollzügen – vom ästhetischen über das wirtschaftliche bis zum religiösen Handeln – überprüfbar sein muss. Die "Philosophie des Geldes" besteht aus zwei Teilen, einem analytischen und einem synthetischen Teil. Im analytischen Teil wird die systematische und historische Explikation einer allgemeinen Kulturtendenz dargestellt. Es geht um den Befund eines Nebeneinanders zweier Welten, dort die Natur und hier die Welt der Werte, die sich aufeinander beziehen und doch voneinander getrennt entwickeln. Auf die Welt der Werte bezogen, also unsere menschliche Welt, die wir im Denken und Handeln erzeugen und die wir sinnverstehend erschließen können spricht Simmel von einer Entwicklungstendenz, einem Übergang von Substanz- zu Funktionsvorstellungen – vom einem sich verändernden Gebrauch der Kategorien, beispielsweise Mittel/Zweck. Im synthetischen Teil geht Simmel auf die Probleme der menschlichen Lebensführung ein, wozu das Problem von Freiheit und Verpflichtung und auch die Frage gehört, wie wir unserem Leben eine Form geben können, Im instruktiven, das Werk abschließenden Kapitel über den Stil des Lebens mündet die Diagnose der modernen Kultur in die Überlegung, was es für uns heißen könnte, unter den bedingungen eines relativistischen Weltbildes dem eigenen Leben eine Form und Richtung zu geben. Die "Philosophie des Geldes" ist ein großes Werk der Philosophie, in dem es, diesseits der üblichen Trennung in theoretische und praktische Fragen der Philosophie, noch einmal um die letzten Probleme der Philosophie geht. (shrink)

Das vorliegende Handbuch bietet eine umfassende Darstellung von Leben, Werk und Wirkung Georg Simmels. Neben Simmels Herkunft aus den Zusammenhängen einer Völkerpsychologie und früher europäisch-ethnologischer Interessen geht es darum, nächst dem ungleich bekannteren Soziologen v. a. den Philosophen Simmel herauszustellen. Komplementär zu einer Darstellung des Lebens Simmels sowie der Wirkung seines Schaffens werden seine Werke nicht nur inhaltlich dargestellt, sondern auch ihre Kontexte einbezogen und behandelt. Der Versuch, Simmels Denken in seiner ganzen Breite und Vielfalt abzubilden, führt dazu, die in (...) der Forschung klassische Einteilung in drei Phasen von Simmels Werk sowie die Ausdifferenzierung in einen eher philosophisch und eher soziologisch orientierten Denker zu Gunsten einer genaueren Gruppierung der Werkphasen aufzuweichen bzw. mitunter ganz aufzugeben. Ziel ist es, weitere thematische Differenzierungen zu ermöglichen und Kontinuitäten und Zäsuren des Simmelschen Denkens möglichst umfangreich nachzuzeichnen. (shrink)

How can one freely act contrary to one’s better judgement about what is right? Since antiquity, this question has attracted attention of many ethicists and theorists of action as the “problem of akrasia”. On a traditional and still influential view akrasia happens when some irrational tendencies, emotions and desires override the rational part of one’s soul and cause them to act in a way which contradicts their rational beliefs about what is good and desirable. In this paper, we aim to (...) show that the view of akrasia as a matter of practical irrationality doesn’t provide an adequate tool for understanding the complex nature of akrasia, since it obstructs an insight into the rational and social dimension of akrasia. We will argue that akrasia, far from being only an individual phenomenon, concerns also the action of broader social and political entities. We will introduce the notion of socio-political akrasia and demonstrate the seriousness of this phenomenon by analysing the case of (in)action of contemporary governments in the context of the climate crisis. Finally, we will conclude by offering a perspective on how to prevent socio-political akrasia. (shrink)

Recenze seznamuje s knihou Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, jejímž autorem je Timothy John Bayne. Recenze je zaměřena na obsah jednotlivých kapitol a celkové zhodnocení knihy. Cílem je seznámit čtenáře s klíčovými tématy, jimž se Bayne v knize věnuje, a s jeho argumentací. Klíčová slova: filosofie mysli, Timothy John Bayne, Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction.

Titian's Rape of Europa is highly praised for its luminous colors and sensual textures. But the painting has an overlooked dark side, namely that it eroticizes rape. I argue that this is an ethical defect that diminishes the painting aesthetically. This argument-that an artwork can be worse off qua work of art precisely because it is somehow ethically problematic-demonstrates that feminist concerns about art can play a legitimate role in art criticism and aesthetic appreciation.

Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...) claim is not, of course, that the child’s experience is ‘empty’; but that, unlike the scientist, it does not see the tube as a cathode ray tube. One way of supporting this claim is to say that one cannot see something as an F unless one has the concept F. Since the child plainly lacks the concept of a cathode ray tube, it cannot see it as a cathode ray tube. Although Perceptual Relativism is hard to believe, this supporting suggestion is not so implausible. After all, when we see (and more generally, perceive) the world, the world is presented to us in a particular way; so how can we see it as being that way unless we have some idea or conception of the way it is presented? We need not be committed to a representative theory of perception to think that perceptions in some sense represent the world. We can express this by saying that perceptions have content. Now it is a commonplace that the contents of beliefs and the other propositional attitudes involve concepts. The belief that this thing is a cathode ray tube involves, in some sense, the concept cathode ray tube. So the line of thought behind Perceptual Relativism may be expressed thus: seeing an F as an F is a state with content. (shrink)

Tim Mulgan presents a penetrating examination of consequentialism: the theory that human behavior must be judged in terms of the goodness or badness of its consequences. The problem with consequentialism is that it seems unreasonably demanding, leaving us no room for our own aims and interests. In response, Mulgan offers his own, more practical version of consequentialism--one that will surely appeal to philosophers and laypersons alike.

Some machine learning models, in particular deep neural networks, are not very well understood; nevertheless, they are frequently used in science. Does this lack of understanding pose a problem for using DNNs to understand empirical phenomena? Emily Sullivan has recently argued that understanding with DNNs is not limited by our lack of understanding of DNNs themselves. In the present paper, we will argue, contra Sullivan, that our current lack of understanding of DNNs does limit our ability to understand with DNNs. (...) Sullivan’s claim hinges on which notion of understanding is at play. If we employ a weak notion of understanding, then her claim is tenable, but rather weak. If, however, we employ a strong notion of understanding, particularly explanatory understanding, then her claim is not tenable. (shrink)

This paper argues that a notion of statistical explanation, based on Salmon’s statistical relevance model, can help us better understand deep neural networks. It is proved that homogeneous partitions, the core notion of Salmon’s model, are equivalent to minimal sufficient statistics, an important notion from statistical inference. This establishes a link to deep neural networks via the so-called Information Bottleneck method, an information-theoretic framework, according to which deep neural networks implicitly solve an optimization problem that generalizes minimal sufficient statistics. The (...) resulting notion of statistical explanation is general, mathematical, and subcausal. (shrink)

In recent years there has been an increase in the number of calls for moral education to receive greater public attention. In our pluralist society, however, it is difficult to find agreement on what exactly moral education requires. Philosophical Discussion in Moral Education develops a detailed philosophical defence of the claim that teachers should engage students in ethical discussions to promote moral competence and strengthen moral character. Paying particular attention to the teacher's role, this book highlights the justification for, and (...) methods of, creating a classroom community of ethical inquiry. (shrink)

Tim Button explores the relationship between words and world; between semantics and scepticism. -/- A certain kind of philosopher – the external realist – worries that appearances might be radically deceptive. For example, she allows that we might all be brains in vats, stimulated by an infernal machine. But anyone who entertains the possibility of radical deception must also entertain a further worry: that all of our thoughts are totally contentless. That worry is just incoherent. -/- We cannot, then, be (...) external realists, who worry about the possibility of radical deception. Equally, however, we cannot be internal realists, who reject all possibility of deception. We must position ourselves somewhere between internal realism and external realism, but we cannot hope to say exactly where. We must be realists, for what that is worth, and realists within limits. -/- In establishing these claims, The Limits of Realism critically explores and develops several themes from Hilary Putnam’s work: the model-theoretic arguments; the connection between truth and justification; the brain-in-vat argument; semantic externalism; and conceptual relativity. The book establishes the continued significance of these topics for all philosophers interested in mind, logic, language, or the possibility of metaphysics. (shrink)

Robert Boyle Robert Boyle was one of the most prolific figures in the scientific revolution and the leading scientist of his day. He was a proponent of the mechanical philosophy which sought to explain natural phenomena in terms of matter and motion, rather than appealing to Aristotelian substantial forms and qualities. He was a … Continue reading Robert Boyle →.

Essential Philosophy of Psychiatry is a concise introduction to the growing field of philosophy of psychiatry. Divided into three main aspects of psychiatric clinical judgement, values, meanings and facts, it examines the key debates about mental health care, and the philosophical ideas and tools needed to assess those debates, in six chapters. In addition to outlining the state of play, Essential Philosophy of Psychiatry presents a coherent and unified approach across the different debates, characterized by a rejection of reductionism and (...) an emphasis on the ineliminability of uncodified skilled judgement. The first part, Values, outlines the debate about whether diagnosis of mental illness is essentially value-laden and argues that the prospects for reducing illness or disease to plainly factual matters are poor. It also explains the important role of skilled contextual judgement, rather than a principles-based deduction, in ethical judgement. The second part, Meanings, examines the central role of understanding and a shared first person perspective, both against attempts to reduce meaning to basic information-processing mechanisms and to explain away the difficulties of understanding psychopathology in recent models of delusion. The third part, Facts, shows the importance of uncodified clinical judgements, both in assessing the validity of psychiatric taxonomy and in the application of Evidence Based Medicine. Despite advances in the codifaction of practice and operationalism of diagnosis, an element of judgement remains in the assessment both of what, at one level, is good evidence for diagnosis and treatment and what, at a higher level, is good evidence for the validity of classification overall. (shrink)

Tim Bayne draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. He develops an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified, and then applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. He goes on to explore the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the (...) sense of embodiment, and for accounts of the self. The Unity of Consciousness draws on a wide range of findings within philosophy and the sciences of the mind to construct an account of the unity of consciousness that is both conceptually sophisticated and scientifically informed. (shrink)

One of the central problems in the study of consciousness concerns the ascription of consciousness. We want to know whether certain kinds of creatures—such as non-human animals, artificially created organisms, and even members of our own species who have suffered severe brain-damage—are conscious, and we want to know what kinds of conscious states these creatures might be in if indeed they are conscious. The identification of accurate markers of consciousness is essential if the science of consciousness is to have any (...) chance of success. (shrink)

Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of a cognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.

Universals are putative objects like wisdom, morality, redness, etc. Although we believe in properties (which, we argue, are not a kind of object), we do not believe in universals. However, a number of ordinary, natural language constructions seem to commit us to their existence. In this paper, we provide a fictionalist theory of universals, which allows us to speak as if universals existed, whilst denying that any really do.

Against transmission -- For attention -- Education in the minor key -- Anthropology, art and the university.

The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ’No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ’Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can (...) directly inform the phenomenal character of perception. (shrink)

We outline a framework for analyzing episodes from the history of science in which the application of mathematics plays a constitutive role in the conceptual development of empirical sciences. Our starting point is the inferential conception of the application of mathematics, recently advanced by Bueno and Colyvan. We identify and discuss some systematic problems of this approach. We propose refinements of the inferential conception based on theoretical considerations and on the basis of a historical case study. We demonstrate the usefulness (...) of the refined, dynamical inferential conception using the well-researched example of the genesis of general relativity. Specifically, we look at the collaboration of the physicist Einstein and the mathematician Grossmann in the years 1912--1913, which resulted in the jointly published ``Outline of a Generalized Theory of Relativity and a Theory of Gravitation,'' a precursor theory of the final theory of general relativity. In this episode, an independently developed mathematical theory, the theory of differential invariants and the absolute differential calculus, was applied in the process of physical theorizing aiming at finding a relativistic theory of gravitation. We argue that the dynamical inferential conception not only provides a natural framework to describe and analyze this episode, but it also generates new questions and insights. We comment on the mathematical tradition on which Grossmann drew, and on his own contributions to mathematical theorizing. We argue that the dynamical inferential conception allows us to identify both the role of heuristics and of mathematical resources as well as the systematic role of problems and mistakes in the reconstruction of episodes of conceptual innovation and theory change. (shrink)

In 1997, a Scottish surgeon by the name of Robert Smith was approached by a man with an unusual request: he wanted his apparently healthy lower left leg amputated. Although details about the case are sketchy, the would-be amputee appears to have desired the amputation on the grounds that his left foot wasn’t part of him – it felt alien. After consultation with psychiatrists, Smith performed the amputation. Two and a half years later, the patient reported that his life had (...) been transformed for the better by the operation [1]. A second patient was also reported as having been satisfied with his amputation [2]. (shrink)